Transcript

Host: This is "On The Line," and I'm Eric Felten.

U.S. intelligence agencies have publicly presented their finding that Syria was building a secret nuclear reactor with help from North Korea. The reactor complex, which could have produced the material for nuclear weapons, was attacked in September by the Israeli Air Force. After the site was bombed, Syria itself destroyed what was left.

White House press secretary Dana Perino said that "This cover-up only served to reinforce our confidence that this reactor was not intended for peaceful purposes."

When Israel bombed the Syrian nuclear site, the U.S. remained studiously silent about the attack. U.S. President George Bush said that caution dictated keeping quiet. "We were concerned," he said, "that an early disclosure would increase the risk of a confrontation in the Middle East."

Why, then, did the United States finally, nearly eight months later, provide an extensive briefing on the Syrian facility? President Bush said that he wanted to send a message both to North Korea and Iran:

President Bush: "We also wanted to advance certain policy objectives through the disclosures, and one would be to the North Koreans to make it abundantly clear that we may know more about you than you think, and, therefore, it’s essential that you have a complete disclosure on not only your plutonium activities but proliferation as well as enrichment activities. And then we have an interest in sending a message to Iran and the world, for that matter, about just how destabilizing a nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East."

Host: The U.S. is particularly concerned about Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear capability because of that nation's long-standing support of terrorism. The State Department recently released its annual report on international terrorism and found that Iran is still the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iran's nuclear program means that the clerical regime may "have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction that could get into the hands of terrorists." Like its ally Iran, Syria has long sponsored terrorist violence. Can nuclear proliferation be stopped? I'll ask my guests -- Gordon Chang, author of the book "Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World"; Farid Ghadry, president of the Reform Party of Syria; and Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of the book "Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States." Welcome. Thanks for joining us. Farid Ghadry, let me ask you first, why now is Syria trying to build a nuclear reactor?

Ghadry: I think Syria has learned that it could get away with murder. We've seen Syria act irresponsibly towards Iraq, towards Israel, towards Lebanon, and we've seen that over and over again that they only get a slap on the wrist in the form of sanctions, and they felt secure enough in the sense that their regime's untouchable, and they went for the gold. And I think that is the reason why Syria feels confident enough that if it acquires nuclear weaponry, that the international community cannot muster enough strength, enough courage, to actually bring the regime down.

Host: Gordon Chang, is this something that North Korea has demonstrated? You know, once you get your hands on nuclear weapons, there's not a lot people can do to pressure you.

Chang: That's exactly what the history of the last three or four years has been. North Korea has been trying to get a bomb since perhaps the 1960s, clearly since the 1970s or 1980s. The United States and the rest of the international community has acted against that but has really been ineffectual. And, of course, North Korea detonated an atomic device in 2006. Since then, the international community has rushed out to try to provide rewards, and, really, countries like Syria, Iran, and others clearly can see what's going to happen. So it makes a whole lot of sense for them to try to get the bomb and then try to reap the benefits of being considered a nuclear power.

Host: Ilan Berman, has the international community basically set up a system now that encourages proliferation?

Berman: I think in a way it has, and it's a very troubling development. You really have two things that are going on. One is the traditional arms-control nuclear nonproliferation regime that's centered around the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, and that regime has grouped countries into categories of "haves" -- countries that have nuclear weapons -- and "have-nots." And what it does is it creates the incentives for countries to pursue peaceful, civilian nuclear-energy programs. It incentivizes and actually mandates that the countries that are the haves help them do that. But in doing so, it helps countries like Iran, that have questionable intent, use that as a stepping-stone for potentially later building civilian -- from a civilian program, building a nuclear weapons program.

The other track you have is that over the last couple of years, we've seen a deviation from this strict arms-control theory and strict arms-control practice to a more values-based proliferation approach, where you have countries like India -- which is not part of the NPT -- still being grandfathered in and given some of the benefits because we like the regime there. And that sends a very dangerous message. It essentially sends a message that we value character, regime character, over norms, and it works in the case of India because we like the regime there. But it doesn't necessarily work in the case of Iran, and it gives Iran a greater excuse to cry foul in the international sphere.

Host: Farid Ghadry, why hasn't Syria been crying foul here about the loss of its reactor?

Ghadry: Syria has taken the position that it's not building a reactor. It has taken the position that there's a conspiracy in the international community to come after Syria. In fact, their ambassador has equated the same kind of pressure that they are -- being exerted against them as equal to the pressure that we exerted against Iraq prior to the war in the Gulf. Syria has sinister goals in the region. They've shown their propensity to terrorize their neighbors. They've shown a propensity to hurt Americans and kill American servicemen in Iraq, kill Lebanese, and kill Jews through their sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas, two terrorist organizations. And I think it's time that this administration realizes that the goals of Syria are beyond regaining the Golan Heights or beyond just entering into Lebanon. They are on track with Iran to lock onto the region with the ultimate goal, control of the oil, control of the countries in the region. In fact, if we remember -- and I'm not an Iranian expert, but if we remember, Iran itself said most of the Gulf people are of Iranian origin. They said this about a year ago, less than a year ago. So, there are -- The goals of Iran and the goals of Syria, mostly, are very sinister in the region, and we have to come to realize that.

Host: Gordon Chang, what are the goals of North Korea in the region? What does North Korea get by coming and secretly arming Syria?

Chang: North Korea gets customers, and therefore it gets revenue streams, which are very important to a regime which has very little in the way of legitimate income. I mean, when you add this, it's like other things, like cigarette smuggling, which perhaps is not quite so bad as selling dangerous technologies, but, clearly, North Korea has been selling nuclear technologies and also missiles and missile parts. You know, in April 2003, a North Korean diplomat told one of ours in Beijing that his country reserved the right to sell nuclear weapons, and I don't think we really understood the significance of that statement at the moment, but, you know, in considering what's happened in September of last year, where it was clear that North Koreans were building a reactor for Syria, now we know really what the meaning of that statement is. And we can expect more proliferation from North Korea unless we raise the cost, and, so far, we haven't done that.

Host: Ilan Berman, what's to stop North Korea at this point from arming any number of nations that may not have good intentions?

Berman: I think that's a great question, because over the last several years, we've seen very concretely, very definitively, that North Korean WMD know-how and ballistic missile know-how has migrated over to populate the arsenals of countries like Syria, countries like Iran. North Korea’s the main source of the Iranian ballistic-missile arsenal. There's a missile called the Shahab-3. It's a reverse-engineered No Dong missile of North Korean origin.

So, North Korea's knowledge is everyone's gain, and so what's emerging, essentially, is that when you talk about nuclear proliferation, you have to take a very top-down approach, a very holistic view, in which you see, really, a self-sustaining architecture, an architecture that's being fed by North Korea, by groups like the Abdul Kadir Khan network in Pakistan, and others. But it's an architecture that is helping countries in the region that want to be [nuclear] weapon states, that want to present a challenge to the West, that want to expand their regional stature -- helping them get technologies that, during the decades of the Cold War, they wouldn't be able to get. They wouldn't be able to get because they wouldn't have the money and they wouldn't have the patron to do so. Now things are different. Now you have countries like Syria, countries like Iran that are able and willing to acquire this technology, and it's making the Middle East and beyond a very dangerous place.

Host: What happens when countries like Syria and Iran do get their hands on nuclear weapons? What are they going to do with them?

Ghadry: You know, the notion that it becomes a deterrent -- I don't believe that this is the case. I believe Syria, as I mentioned earlier, has a lot sinister goals in the region, and I think eventually they will threaten to use those weapons against their neighbors. They will maneuver to show that they're intent to use those weapons. In order to extract concessions, in order to extract more power in the region, and in order to hegemonize the region, according to the mullahs and according to the militant socialist government that we have in Syria.

I think it behooves us, it behooves the U.S., it behooves Syrians as well, to realize that Syria, with a nuclear weapon, would become a grave danger for the region, let alone if Iran gets the weapon. So, I think we have to be careful of that, and, by default, we cannot allow this to happen. And yet we have not seen the move from this administration that would indicate they're going to put enough pressure on Syria to stop them from taking on another weapon or from building a nuclear weapon. I have to remind you very quickly that, you know, Reagan, in 1986, when [Muammar] Gaddafi was sponsoring terrorism, he [Gaddafi] bombed a disco in Berlin. Reagan responded by bombing Libya and hurting Gaddafi where it matters. And then after that, we saw Libya very tamed and very careful about what it does, and I believe that we should do the same with Syria. I believe that we should actually take the step, actually threaten Syria and threaten Iran to the point that they will realize that if they take those steps, major steps, toward nuclearization, that the price they will pay will be too dear for them.

Host: Gordon Chang?

Chang: You know, the perception that Syria is dangerous is not just shared by Israel, which bombed that site last September. It's shared, really, by all the countries in the region, and the reason we know that is that after the bombing of the Syrian site, Syria's Arab neighbors didn't say anything, or they said extremely little -- the bare minimum -- and I think that's an indication that the countries do believe that Syria's intent is indeed malign. This is no longer like an Israeli-versus-the-rest-of-the-region issue. This is the rest of the region being very concerned, not only about Syria but about Iran, and I think we should take our cue, really from this.

Host: Ilan Berman?

Berman: I think this is exactly right, and it actually mirrors something that's happening further south in the Persian Gulf. You have -- On the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom in late 2002, you had one declared nuclear aspirant in the Persian Gulf. And it wasn't Iraq. It was Iran itself. Today you have at least eleven. You have Iran, the six countries of the GCC, and Turkey and Egypt and Yemen and others that are coming down the pike. And so the timing isn't coincidental here. Countries in the region are very concerned about the nuclear capability of Iran, about what Iran's going to do if it gets this capability, and they're making other plans. They're making other plans because they're concerned about what they have to throw at the Iranian threat, and also they're concerned about whether the United States will be there in the long term to protect them.

And so this speaks volumes about what American policy in the region should be. First and foremost, American policy's concern about nonproliferation, about preventing additional states from getting nuclear capability, getting WMD capability, we're facing a situation where if Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria go nuclear, you're not going to be facing one additional nuclear power in the Middle East, you're going to be facing many, because countries are going to take their cues. They're going to say, "We need a nuclear capability ourselves in response," or, like Syria, they're going to say, "Hey, the Iranians are acquiring this capability. The Americans aren't doing anything about it. This gives us the green light, the open door, to go through that door ourselves." And this is a very dangerous development, because if we're unable to contain one nuclear Iran, think about what it would look like to try to contain a nuclear-arms race, including the one that's already developing in the Middle East. It speaks volumes about what it's going to look like for U.S. policy and American force posture in Iraq and elsewhere over the next several years.

Host: Now, is an arms race, a nuclear-arms race, in the Middle East necessarily more dangerous than a nuclear-arms race elsewhere? The U.S. repeats its concern often that the problem with Iran acquiring nuclear weapons isn't just that it's one more country with nuclear weapons but rather that there is something qualitatively different about a nation that is a sponsor of terrorism having at its disposal nuclear weapons that may then end up in the hands of terrorists. How real is that threat?

Ghadry: It is a real threat, and I think you put your finger on it, Eric, here. Somebody brought up the issue, I think -- brought up the issue of India, that we are helping India. Mr. Berman -- Ilan -- brought it up. There's a difference between a country that is peaceful, democratic, where the decision of using a nuclear weapon is based on a lot of people coming together to create the havoc that a nuclear weapon could create. But a nuclear weapon in the hands of a dictatorship -- one dictator, one man can actually push the button -- that's where the danger lies, and I think that's where the difference is and that's why we believe that countries like Iran, North Korea, Syria, countries who have the militant regime, who are capable of actually pushing that button, and who do not have a democracy, where the leaders are accountable to their own people and accountable to the rest of the world -- that's where the danger lies, and I think I agree with the two gentlemen here that we need -- The U.S. administration has to take a much more aggressive stand on the issue of proliferation in the Middle East.

Host: Gordon Chang, is it a realistic concern that, because leaders in Iran often say things like they plan to obliterate Israel, they would like to see it wiped off the map, that nuclear weapons are -- would be used for that purpose?

Chang: I think that what we can say is that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is unacceptably high, because we have regimes that are state sponsors of terrorism, as we've just heard. Also, we've got unstable regimes, and so you put that together in a volatile region, and you have a mix that, you know, we can't really predict. You know, the Cold War really was interesting because we had two superpowers, essentially two status-quo powers, facing off. And, therefore, that did give a certain amount of stability to this bipolar system. We won't have that in the next era our world goes into, because if we, for instance, did have Iran and Syria have the bomb, we saw that the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council now want to have civilian nuclear programs that could be stepping-stones to six new nuclear-weapons programs. Very interesting. After the Gulf Cooperation Council announced it wants its civilian programs, Jordan announced it wanted one, Yemen then said it wanted one, and soon following that, Egypt said that it was going to step up a civilian nuclear program. So, we can see the chain reaction happening. This is not just theoretical. This is happening before our very eyes.

Host: Ilan Berman, we see in Iran that, for all of the sanctions that the U.N. has brought against Iran and whatever pain that may have imposed upon the Iranian people through inability to get certain goods, through injury to their economy, et cetera, that, actually, the nuclear program is a popular nationalistic program in Iran. Do the people of Iran -- have they realized the extent to which the program puts them at risk, that having nuclear weapons means that any deterrence regime is going to mean that you yourself are then targeted with retaliatory nuclear weapons and this becomes something that's a hair-trigger system?

Berman: I think the answer is "no," because, to a large extent, the dialogue over the ultimate disposition of the Iranian nuclear program, what it's intended for, what it's going to do for the Iranian regime, has been one-sided. The Iranian regime has been monopolizing that dialogue. If you look at surveys that have come out recently of Iranian public opinion, you do find that the plurality support the idea of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, of their country gaining that capability. But far fewer actually take the next step and say, "Oh, we believe that should then be transformed into a nuclear-weapons program." In fact, two thirds of respondents in a recent World Public Opinion poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org said that, in fact, "having a nuclear weapon is contrary to the teachings of Islam and we won't support it."

So, the real question becomes, "How do you interject yourself as the United States, as the West, as Europe, as concerned powers in Asia -- how do you interject yourself into that dialogue and say to the Iranian people, not the Iranian regime, "The costs of this program are going to be economic, they're going to be diplomatic, they're going to be political, but they're going to be real" and to fragment that public opinion. Because so far, what the Iranian regime has done has managed to take something that is essentially a cleric bomb, it's not a program that provides benefit to the Iranian people as a whole, it provides benefit to the clerical bomb and transformed it into a nationalist cause. And one of, I think, our main objectives needs to be to explain the real costs and the real dangers to the Iranian people and the Iranian nation as a whole of having their regime proceed down that path.

Host: I'm afraid that's going to have to be the last word for today. We're out of time. But I'd like to thank my guests -- Gordon Chang, author of the book "Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World"; Farid Ghadry, president of the Reform Party of Syria; and Ilan Berman, Vice President for Foreign Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of the book "Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States." Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can reach us through our website at www.voanews.com/ontheline. For "On The Line," I'm Eric Felten.